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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT BUDDY WASHINGTON, 
Appellant, 
-vs.-
ST.ATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 10387 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Robert Buddy Washington, appeals 
from a judgment of the District Court of Salt Lake 
County, committing the appellant to the Utah State 
Prison upon conviction of the crime of third degree burg-
lary in violation of Section 76-9-5, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was charged with the crimes of second 
degree burglary and grand larceny. He was tried in 
2 
the Third District Court, Salt Lake County and 
' COIJ. 
victed of the crime of third degree burglary. The trial 
court instructed the jury only on third degree hnrg-Ja
1
,. 
(R. 41). The trial court sentenced and committed tli~ 
appellant to the Utah State Prison on April 1, 19ni. 
and the judgment thereon was entered April 9, 191).\ 
The appellant's notice of appeal was filed on April ' 
1965. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits the conviction should h,, 
affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant submits the following statement nf 
facts: 
On December 19, 1964, Oscar Singleton resided at 
624 South 4th East, Salt Lake City, Utah (T. 11). He 
lived with his wife who, on December 16, 1964, had gone 
to Savannah, Georgia, to her mother's funeral (T. 121 
19). On the 19th of December, 1964, Mr. Singleton M1 
his home at about 5 :30 p.m., and went to the Elks Ch11 
in Salt Lake City (T. 13). He returned to his hmne ii: 
about 8 :30 to 9 :00 p.m. ( T. 14). Upon turning on tl!i 
lights, he noticed a window broken, a screen torn, that 
that dresser drawers were open, and the back door w33 
open, although when he left he had locked all doors rT .. 
14, 15). It was like a "cyclone went through the houst 
(T. 31). Mr. Singleton did not touch any part of th·: 
3 
tli~tt1rl1«d honH', and called the police (T. 15). Accord-
ing to I\1 r. Singleton, $170 in cash, a shotgun, flashlight, 
and swall rndio were missing (T. 17). The $170 in cash 
]1e Jiad supposedly withdrawn from a savings account 
at. Continental Bank on December 16, 1964 (T. 12). 
The Salt Lake City Police arrived in response to 
Mr. Singleton's call. Officer Arthur Allen noticed a 
broken and opened window, an open back door, an open 
brief case, and broken and torn screens at Mr. Single-
ton's home (T. 38). He also observed that clothing was 
disheveled, and observed a footprint, like a gym shoe, in 
the dirt near the broken window (T. 39). All the glass 
broken in the home fell on the inside ( T. 43). 
Mr. Singleton testified at trial that the defendant 
had never been in his home prior to December 19, 1964, 
according to his knowledge (T. 11). Officer Wade Robin-
son of the Salt Lake City Police crime laboratory took 
two latent fingerprints from a "boxtop" in a bedroom 
in Mr. Singleton's home (T. 18, 54, 56). The finger-
prints matched those of the appellant in 16 points (T. 
67). Officer Robinson testified that the chances of nine 
points of a fingerprint being similar were 1 quadrillion, 
950 trillion, 125 billion to one, based on authoritative 
calculations (T. 51). The fingerprints on the boxtop 
were those of the appellant (T. 56, 61, 69). 
Joseph McQueen testified he had known the appel-
lant for 15 or 16 years, and observed him about a week 
before Christmas in the Porters and Waiters Club in 
Ogden at about 8 :30 p.m., before playing in the band 
4 
( T. 80). He testified he could not be certain it wa8 \ti, 
19th of December (T. 83). He also testified the apptl 
lant had approached him before trial about testif\in·' 
as to an alibi (T. 83). He testified at one point th~t h~ 
did not play in any band during December, 1964 (T. s:I! 
Mary Ann Stevenson, a defense witness, testifie
1
j 
she left Salt Lake City with appellant on the 17th oi 
December, arrived in Pocatello on the 18th, and ltf: 
the afternoon of the 19th, arriving in Ogden about 8:~1 
p.m. According to her, the appellant and McQueen hau 
a conversation outside of the Porters and Waiters Cluli. 
and thereafter went to a hotel with another Mr. Wash-
ington, and had a drink after buying some liquor (T. 91. 
98). Thereafter, she testified appellant arrived in Salt 
Lake City at 12 :00 p.m., on December 19, 1964. On croii· 
examination, she testified that she and appellant stayea 
in Pocatello two nights, Thursday and Friday, the 18tn 
and 19th of December, 1964. It is further submitted l11r 
testimony was a mass of inconsistency and subtPrfu~1 
(See T. 94-100.) 
Paul Brennan, an official of Continental Bank, testi 
fied that Mr. Singleton had made no withdrawals 1·; 
money from his savings account, according to their r~c­
ords in December, 1964, and had a little over $4.00 on 
deposit (T. 101). 
Based on the above facts, the jury returned a verdict 
of guilty of burglary in the third degree. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE APPELLANT HAS NOT PERFECTED HIS 
APPEAL. 
rr'he transcript in the instant case reflects that the 
appellant was sentenced on April 1, 1965, to be confined 
in the Utah State Prison. Commitment was issued April 
2, 1965. However, the formal judgment was not filed in 
the clerk's office until April 9, 1965 (T. 5, see clerk's 
entry on rear of page). The appellant's notice of appeal 
was dated the 6th of April (T. 6), and was filed in the 
clerk's office on April 8, 1965 (see clerk's entry on rear 
of page 6). Consequently, the appellant's notice of ap-
peal was filed and his appeal taken prior to the entry 
of final judgment. 
Rule 77-39-5, Rules of Criminal Procedure, adopted 
March 27, 1964, effective June 1, 1964, provides: 
"All appeals in criminal cases must be taken 
within one month after the entry of the judgment 
appealed from, or, if a motion for a new trial is 
made, within one month after the denial of the 
motion." 
Since the appellant's appeal was not taken within 
one month after the entry of judgment, his appeal was 
premature and has not been properly perfected. It is 
submitted, therefore, that this case should be dismissed. 
In the event that the court feels the appeal is properly 
taken, it is respectfully submitted that the term "entry 
of the judgment" in the Rules of CriminaJ Procedure 
6 
above mentioned should be clarified, and the trial ronrt' 
and clerks of the courts be given definitive instruct· . 
·ions 
as to when and how a criminal judgment is to be enterrd. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RECEIV. 
ING THE TEST.IMONY OF OSCAR SINGLETON 
SINCE NO OBJECTION TO ITS RECEIPT NOR ANY 
MOTION TO STRIKE WAS MADE. 
The appellant contends the testimony of Osrar 
Singleton should not have been admitted. The basis of 
the appellant's contention is that part of the testimony 
of Mr. Singleton was contradicted by a witness for the 
appellant, Paul Brennan. 
Mr. Singleton's testimony was as to the breaking 
into his home by some unauthorized person and the tak· 
ing of certain items from the home. Mr. Singleton testi. 
fied that he had taken $170.00 from his savings account 
in the Continental Bank to use to go to his mother-i11. 
law's funeral in Georgia (T. 12). He testified that this 
was placed on a dresser in a bedroom and was gone after 
the burglary (T. 11). Mr. Paul Brennan, a bank official 
from Continental Bank, testified that the records of the 
bank did not disclose any withdrawal of funds during 
the time Mr. Singleton claimed to have made such a with-
drawal (T. 107). This is the basis for appellant's claim 
of error. 
It is apparent that there is no merit to the appel-
lant's contention. At the time the evidence was offeredi 
no objection was voiced, nor did there appear to bP any 
7 
rr::i:-on for exclusion. Under these circumstances, the 
court did not err in receiving the evidence. State v. 
T11 tt le, 1(j Utah 2d 580, 399 Pac. 2d 580 ( 1965) ; Abbott, 
cr:mi11ul Trial Practice, 4th Ed., Sections 348-351. 
Additionally, after the evidence of Mr. Brennan 
wa~ received, the appellant made no motion to strike or 
n'movc Mr. Singleton's inconsistent testimony from the 
jnry. Certainly, at that time if the evidence of Mr. 
~ingleton was in any way improperly before the jury, 
it was incumbent upon the appellant to move to strike 
thr evidence or otherwise remove it from the jury's con-
sideration. Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice, 4th Ed., 
~re. 352; Peterson v. People, 384 Pac. 2d 460 (Colo. 
19fi3); State v. Miller, 71 Ariz. 140, 224 Pac. 2d 205 
(1950); Midkiff v. State, 29 Ariz. 523, 243 Pac. 601 
(192G). Having failed to move timely, appellant is with-
on( a hasis to claim error. 
'l'here could have been no prejudice to the appellant 
in any evmt. All the contradictory testimony did was 
raise an issue for the jury on the question of talring 
frow the home. This went to the charge of grand lar-
(·fl1~-. rrhe appellant was not convicted on the grand 
lar<'1°ny charge, and, therefore, the jury apparently be-
li~nd Mr. Brennan's testimony over Mr. Singleton's. 
Tlwrpfore, no prejudice resulted. The crimes of burglary 
aur1 larceny are separate and distinct, State v. Jones, 
13 Utah 2d 35, 368 Pac. 2d 262 (1962) ; Rogerson v. 
llarris, 111 Utah 330, 178 Pac. 2d 397 (1947), and Mr. 
~inglrton's testimony on the burglary aspect is well cor-
8 
roborated by the individual and independent observa. 
tions of the police. Consequently, appellant has no ba<;i~ 
for reversal. 
POINT III. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN 
THE CONVICTION FOR BURGLARY IN THE THIRD 
DEGREE. 
The appellant's contention that the verdict in the 
instant case is contrary to the evidence is without merit. 
The facts must be viewed in a light most favorable 
to the jury's verdict. State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 
347 Pac. 2d 865; State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110, 30i 
Pac. 2d 212; State v. Shonka, 3 Utah 2d 124, 279 Pac 
2d 711. 
When so viewed, it is apparent the evidence is snffi. 
cient to sustain the conviction. 
The facts show that on the 19th of December, 1964, 
Mr. Oscar Singleton left his home at about 5 :00 o'clock 
p.m., to go to the Elks Club. He secured the home, ana 
when he left, it was in order. He returned at about 
9 :00 o'clock p.m., and found a window broken, a rear 
door open, and screens torn and disturbed. This was 
the same condition in which the premises were found 
when the police arrived a short time later. In additio~ 
drawers had been opened and things pulled out. The 
house was disheveled and disarrayed. This alone would 
be sufficient evidence to show a burglarious entry. Foot-
prints outside the house also support such a conclusion 
9 
In addition, Mr. Singleton testified to m1ssmg a 
small radio, a 12-gauge shotgun, and a pullman flash-
light, apart from the claimed loss of money (T. 17). 
The appellant had never been in Mr. Singleton's 
hmnc prior to the time in question, and no claim of 
authorized presence was made or evidence offered in 
sup1iort of such a conclusion. Police found two latent 
fingerprints on a boxtop in one of the disarranged bed-
rooms. These prints matched lrnown prints of the ap-
pellant in sixteen different ways. An expert testified 
that the chance of nine points of different prints being 
comparable was 1 quadrillion, 950 trillion, 125 billion to 
one. These prints clearly place the appellant in the Sin-
gleton home, and tie him in as the burglar. 
The appellant's alibi witnesses afford no basis for 
reyersal. They need not be believed by the jury. State 
1·. Roliinso11, 116 Utah 397, 211 Pac. 2d 177 (1949); State 
r. ;lfills, 122 Utah 306, 249 Pac. 2d 211 (1952). 
In People v. Pianezzi, 42 Cal. App. 2d 270, 108 Pac. 
2J l).C\5 ( 19-U), cert. denied 314 U.S. 611, the court noted 
llte general rule: 
"Defendant's second proposition is also un-
tenable. The law is established that the question 
of ·whether or not defendant has established his 
alibi is one of fact, the determination of which 
upon conflicting evidence, as in the instant case, 
will not be disturbed on appeal." 
1n Boydston v. State, Old. Cr. 172, 152 Pac. 2d 701 
i 194:1), the court stated: 
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"The defense offered by the defendant in tl · 
case was that of an alibi. He claimed that hii ,1~' 
on the streets of Cache, and at his home in Car·l· 
d~ring the time that the alleged offense was coi~ 
m1tted, and attempted to support this defensp h' 
the testimon! of his mother, two brothers, an;\ 
one other witness. To speak of it in the rnoit 
favorable terms, the evidence was conflicti 11 ~. 
The time element in connection with the alibi w;, 
so close, and the defendant was in such close prox-
imity to the place where the crime was comrnitltd 
and at the time it was committed, and the jun 
having passed upon the evidence, would be suffi. 
cient for this court to refuse to set the judgment 
and sentence aside. See the case of Gregg v. Stu/. 
69 Old. Cr. 103, 101 P.2d 289." 
The alibi witnesses in the instant case were far from 
convincing. At one point Mr. McQueen, who supposedly 
saw the appellant in Ogden, Utah, at about the time of 
the burglary, testified he couldn't be certain of the date. 
Further, although he was supposedly playing in a band 
on the night he saw the appellant, at one point he te~ti· 
fied he did not play during December, the time the criJn( 
occurred. 
The appellant's female companion was equally un· 
believable. She was confused as to what nights she and 
appellant stayed in Pocatello, Idaho, saying at one voin! 
it was Thursday and Friday, although she said she w~ 
with the appellant in Ogden on Friday, the 19th .01 
December, 1964. She said they saw Mr. McQueen outsidi 
the Elks Club, although McQueen said it was inside. Shr 
h t thy rnir could not identify the names of persons t a e ·. 
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and spent time with. When pressed for the name of one 
person she and appellant had been with, she brilliantly 
came forth with the name of Mr. Washington, the same 
name as appellant. It must be concluded the alibi testi-
mony was hardly of such a nature as to compel a jury 
to accept it. The evidence sustains the verdict. State v. 
Washington, 13 Utah 2d 92, 368 Pac. 2d 709 (1962). 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant's contentions on appeal are wholly 
without legal merit. The evidence of record is sufficient 
to sustain the jury's findings. This court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
